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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintifCAppellee
Case No. 970681-CA

v.
VERNON E. CLIFFORD,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, a
class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1995). The
conviction was entered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the
Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1996).

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
and
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court correctly deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence found
during the inventory search?
A "bifurcated" appellate review standard applies for this issue: Underlying fact
findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The court's
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, with a "measure of deference" accorded
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to highly fact-sensitive conclusions. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-40 (Utah
1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-71 (Utah 1993).
CONSTUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This case involves the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
This case also involves portions of Utah statutes and Rules of Evidence. The
relevant parts of those statutes and rules are set forth where necessary in the text.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Vernon Clifford was charged with carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle under
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-505 (1995). Clifford moved to suppress the firearm found
during an inventory search of the vehicle. A motion hearing was held and Clifford
argued that the firearm should be suppressed because the State did not show that the
department had standardized procedures or that the officer followed the procedures.
Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript ("HT") p. 37.
The trial court made findings of fact on the record and denied Clifford's Motion
to Suppress. HT p. 43. Clifford then entered a conditional plea to the charge of carrying
a loaded firearm in a vehicle and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his Motion to
Suppress pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Clifford received a
60 day suspended jail sentenced and was ordered to pay $125 of the fine.
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State recites the facts in a light supporting the trial court's denial of Clifford's
Motion to Suppress. See, e.g.,State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1985). On
January 5th, 1997, Deputy James F. Blanton was patrolling the East Division when he
noticed a 1992 Chevy truck with a registration sticker that had expired in March of 1996.
HT pp. 5-6,1. 20-25, 5-9. Blanton initiated a traffic stop, and the truck pulled into a
parking lot on 3400 South and State Street. HT p. 6,1. 11-13. Blanton asked for
Clifford's driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. HT p. 7,1. 3-4. Vernon
Clifford produced his license and registration, but was unable to provide any proof that
his vehicle was insured. HT p. 7,1. 7-8,12-13. Although the registration certificate also
indicated that the registration had expired nine months before, Blanton ran a check on the
certificate and verified that March, 1996 was the expiration date. HT pp. 7-8,1. 25, 1.
Clifford had informed Blanton that he had consumed alcohol, and Blanton called
for a motors officer to conduct a field sobriety test on Clifford. HT p. 8,1. 11-12. The
motors officer determined that Clifford was not intoxicated enough to be a danger, and
Blanton issued Clifford a citation for the expired registration, lack of insurance, and
informed Clifford that he would be impounding the vehicle. HT pp. 8-9,1. 21-23, 1-4.
Blanton asked Clifford to take a seat while the inventory was conducted. HT p. 9,1. 8-11.
Blanton also asked Clifford's passenger to step out of the truck. HT p. 9,1. 12-13.
Blanton patted the passenger down for weapons, then proceeded to search the passenger
compartment of the vehicle. HT p. 9,1. 14-15.
Blanton first examined the passenger's side of the vehicle, and found three open
beer cans in the floorboard. HT p. 11,1. 1-3. Blanton then proceeded to the driver's side,
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where he immediately noted a brown leather holster in the pouch of the driver's door. HT
p. 11,1. 10-11. Blanton pulled the firearm out, and Clifford spontaneously claimed
ownership. HT p. 11,1. 19-21. Clifford told Blanton that there was a bullet in the
chamber and the firearm was ready to shoot. HT pp. 11-12,1. 19-23, 1-5. Blanton took
the firearm out of the holster and disarmed it, then placed Clifford under arrest for
possessing a concealed loaded weapon. HTp. 17,1. 16-17,20-23. Blanton cuffed
Clifford and placed him in his patrol vehicle. HT pp. 17-18,1. 21, 25, 1. Deputy Romero
completed the inventory of Clifford's vehicle. HT p. 18,1. 2.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly denied Clifford's Motion to Suppress the firearm because the
firearm was discovered during a proper inventory search and was therefore admissible as
evidence. A proper inventory search does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to
be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment only prohibits
those searches that are unreasonable, and an inventory conducted pursuant to regularized
procedures is a reasonable search that is exempt from the warrant requirement. Inventory
searches serve the important functions of securing the property of an individual whose
car has been impounded, of shielding the police from claims that the contents of an
impounded vehicle were disturbed or stolen, and allowing the police to discover
dangerous conditions within an impounded vehicle.
A valid inventory search must be conducted in compliance with regularized
department procedures. The State carried its burden of demonstrating that Deputy
Blanton had certain knowledge of his department's inventory procedures. The State is
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not required to submit the department's written procedures. The State may establish
certain knowledge of the procedures through the testimony of the officer who conducted
the search. Blanton testified that he receives training in impoundments each year and
also demonstrated detailed knowledge of his department's policies during crossexamination.
The State also carried its burden of establishing that Blanton acted in accordance
with those procedures. The State is not required to submit written documents to meet this
burden, and may prove that its agents complied with procedures through the testimony of
the officer who conducted the search. Blanton provided testimony that adequately
established that he acted pursuant to his department's policies.
Blanton's inventory was not a pretext to search Clifford's truck for incriminating
evidence. An inventory may be suspect as a pretext concealing an investigatory motive
when the officer conducting the search fails to follow department procedures in
significant ways. Blanton did not deviate from his department's procedures or otherwise
act in any way that could give rise to a valid suspicion that his inventory search was
conducted as a pretext to "rummage through" Clifford's truck.

6

ARGUMENT
1.

THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY BASED ON RULE
1002 BECAUSE THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE DURING SUPPRESSION
HEARINGS.

Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not require that the State produce
the Sheriffs Department's written manual because the trial court is not bound by the
Rules of Evidence at suppression hearings. Defendant argues that Rule 1002 requires
that the State produce the written manual containing the Sheriffs Department's inventory
and impound policy. However, the Utah Rules of Evidence do not apply to hearings on
the admissibility of evidence. Utah R. Evid. 1001(b)(1).
Rule 1101 states "The rules . . . do not apply in the following situations: (1)
Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under Rule 104(a)." Utah R.
Evid. 1101(b). Rule 104(a), Questions of admissibility generally, includes questions
concerning the admissibility of evidence. Utah R. Evid. 104(a).
During hearings on preliminary questions including the admissibility of evidence,
the court is not bound by the rules of evidence. IdL Therefore, the trial court acted within
its discretion when the court overruled defendant's objection based on Rule 1002 of the
Rule of Evidence.
Defendant claims that "this Court in Strikling, stated that 'the State could not
carry its burden if it could not produce a written policy in the face of a [best evidence]
objection to an officer's testimony concerning written [inventory] policies.'" Brief of
Appellant p. 12. While this is a direct quote from this Court, the defendant omitted the
beginning of this sentence that states "We note the possibility that the State could not
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carry its burden . . . " State v. Strikling, 844 P.2d 979, 990 n. 12 (Utah App. 1992). This
Court specifically stated in Strikling that "precedent [does not] require, that the
government must submit written procedures in order to carry its burden of showing that
its agents acted in accordance with standardized procedures when performing an
inventory search of an impounded automobile." Id. at 989.
The trial court correctly allowed Deputy Blanton to testify as to his understanding
of the written policy rather than require the State to introduce the written manual.

II. THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS CONSTITUTIONAL.
The trial court correctly denied Clifford's Motion to Suppress the firearm because
it was discovered pursuant to a proper inventory search. The Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the state from proving charges with evidence discovered during an inventory
search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US 367, 744 (1987). Therefore, because Blanton
properly impounded and inventoried Clifford's vehicle, the trial court did not err in
allowing the firearm into evidence.
Inventory searches of impounded vehicles constitute a well-defined exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Colorado 479 US 367, 745 (1987).
Because of their mobility, automobiles are not entitled to the same rigorous warrant
requirements and privacy expectations as a residence. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
US 364, 367 (1976). Inventory searches are not investigatory in nature, but serve to
protect the contents of an impounded car, and shield the police from claims of disturbed
or missing property when an impounded vehicle is recovered by its owner. Inventory
searches are not unconstitutional intrusions because an inventory conducted pursuant to
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standardized procedures is reasonable, and the Fourth Amendment only prohibits
unreasonable searches. Opperman, 428 at 373.

A. The State Established that Deputy Blanton had
Knowledge of Departmental Inventory Procedures.
The state established that Deputy Blanton was familiar with the Sheriffs
Department procedures for inventorying an impounded vehicle through the detailed
testimony offered at suppression hearing. In Strickling, this Court found that an officer
had demonstrated certain knowledge of department policies based solely on the testimony
he offered at trial. State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 990 (Utah. App. 1992) (affirming
trial court's denial of Motion to Suppress evidence discovered during inventory search).
The testimony given by Deputy Blanton is sufficient to find that he had certain
knowledge of department procedures. In Strickling, the court stated that the government
is required to demonstrate the existence of standardized procedures for regulating
inventory searches. Strickling, 844 at 988. The only evidence that the government
offered about the existence of department procedures was testimony from the officer who
conducted the inventory search. Id. at 988. The inventory sheet used during the impound
search was never offered into evidence. Id. at 989 n. 8. The court ruled that the officer
demonstrated certain knowledge of department policies by testifying to the existence of
those policies and his significant experience in carrying those policies out, describing
what areas of the vehicle are subject to search, and responding to several questions during
cross-examination about the procedures. Id. at 990.
The present case is very similar to Strickling. Deputy Blanton provided testimony
that his department does have standardized procedures on inventory searches and that he
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attends classes concerning inventory searches each year. HT p. 16, 1-24. During crossexamination the defense asked several questions concerning details of those procedures.
Blanton's responses demonstrate close familiarity with those policies1. The State,
therefore, carried its burden of demonstrating that Blanton had certain knowledge of his
department's standardized procedures for conducting inventory searches.

B. The State Established That Officer Blanton Adhered To
His Department's Procedures While Conducting The
Inventory Search.
The State carried its burden of showing that Blanton complied with inventory
procedures by providing testimony that Blanton had complied. The State does not need
to offer more than testimony. Precedent does not require the government to submit
written procedures in order to carry its burden of showing that its agents acted in
accordance with their department's policies. Strickling, 844 at 979. Therefore, the
testimony that Blanton provided demonstrating his compliance is sufficient.
In Strickling, the court noted that the "pivotal determination is whether the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing was sufficient to support the finding that"
the officer conducted the inventory search in accordance with the department's policies.
Strickling, 844 at 988. In reaching its conclusion that the officer had complied, the
appellate court looked to United States v. Kordosky. Id, at 989. In Kodorsky, the court

J

HT pp. 29-30,1.30, 1-9
Q: Now your office, the sheriffs office, has a standardized policy on doing inventory searches.
A: It does
Q: And in that procedure or policy it sets out specifically how to deal with inventorying the contents.
A: It does.
Q: And how to deal with open or closed containers that you might run across.
A: Yes.
Q: Or how to deal with contraband or firearms.
A: Yes.
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held that the testimony of two police officers was sufficient to demonstrate that the search
had been conducted in compliance with department procedures. United States v.
Kordosky, 921 F.2d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 1991) cert, denied 112 S.Ct. 94.
Blanton offered testimony that demonstrates that he followed his department's
procedure. Blanton testified that he has received annual training in impounding vehicles
where he was taught to inform the driver that he would be impounding the car, then begin
inventorying. HTpg. 16,1.20-24. Blanton did follow this procedure with Clifford.
After checking Clifford's registration to ensure that it had expired, Blanton advised
Clifford that he would be impounding his vehicle. HT pg. 9,1. 1-4. After asking the
passenger to step from the car, Blanton began inventorying the contents of the passenger
compartment. HT pg. 9,1. 12-15. Blanton also testified that he used and signed a state
tax impound form as required by his department for an inventory search of a vehicle
impounded for expired registration. HT pg. 10,1. 5, 12-15.
The defense argues that Deputy Blanton did not conduct a complete inventory
search because he did not search every part of the vehicle. In State v. Sterger, the
appellate court rejected similar reasoning. In Sterger, the defendant argued that the
officer had not followed inventory procedures because he had not opened every closed
container in the impounded vehicle, although department procedures provided that "[a]
written inventory shall be made of all contents of the vehicle, both in opened, closed
and/or locked containers." State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,126 (Utah App. 1991). The
court found this reasoning unpersuasive, and relied on Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1
(1990) quoting "[t]he allowance of the exercise of judgment based on concerns related to
the purposes of an inventory search does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Sterger,
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808 at 126, FN 4. Therefore, the mere fact that Blanton did not open the glove
compartment or climb behind the truck seats alone does not render the inventory search
invalid.
Furthermore, Deputy Blanton testified that Deputy Romero completed the
inventory search because he was required to secure the firearm and arrest defendant. HT
p. 10, 21-22. Up to that point, Blanton was conducting a thorough search, looking under
the seats and checking the door pouches of the passenger compartment. HT. p. 11,1. 1,
11, 23. Blanton testified that the moment he noticed the firearm in the driver's door
panel, his attention immediately focused on the presence of the weapon. HT. p. 28,1. 1617. Blanton's responsibilities shifted in that moment from listing the contents of an
vehicle impounded for expired registration to dealing with a loaded firearm and the man
who was carrying it illegally.
The fact that Deputy Blanton did not personally complete the inventory search
render the search invalid. In State v. Sterger, an officer conducting an inventory search
discovered marijuana in a vehicle involved in an accident. State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,
123 (Utah App. 1991). The officer discontinued the search because other responsibilities,
such as removing the accident victims and arresting and transporting the defendant, took
priority over completing the inventory. Sterger, 808 at 125. The inventory was not
completed until two days later. Id at 124. The defendant argued that the search was
invalid because department policies did not allow for bifurcated inventories. Id at 125.
The court disagreed, stating that the fact that a bifurcated search was not specifically
provided for in the procedures did not render the search illegal. Id. at 125.
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The present case is quite similar to Sterger. Blanton discontinued the search when
it became necessary for him to arrest and transport Clifford. Rather than wait for an
extended period to complete the inventory, however, another officer, Deputy Romero,
stepped in to handle the search. HT p. 10, 21-22. The fact that another officer completed
the search does not mean that Blanton was not following procedure. The purpose of an
inventory search is to protect the police from dangerous conditions, shield them from
claims of missing or damaged property, and secure the property of the owner of the
impounded car. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). The fact that another
officer stepped in to continue the inventory search when Blanton was needed elsewhere
does not interfere with these purposes, but makes their expeditious completion possible.

III. The Inventory Search Was Not a Pretext For a
Warrantless Investigatory Search.
The inventory search exception to the requirement of a warrant does not apply
when the inventory is actually a pretext to an "investigatory police motive". State v.
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985). In other words, an inventory is not valid if it is
merely a "fishing expedition for evidence." Sterger at 125. However, a search carried out
in accordance with standard procedures tends to ensure that the intrusion is appropriately
limited to a caretaking function. Opperman, 428 at 375. The existence of regularized
procedures for handling inventory searches play a role identical to that of search warrants
in guarding against arbitrariness in who and what officers select to search. Strickling, 844
at 987. Inventories that were not conducted in compliance with department policies
should not be upheld under Opperman. Id. at 987.
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The defense argues that Blanton deviated from department procedures by not
personally completing the inventory search. The fact that another officer stepped in to
complete the search while Blanton was handling the arrest and transportation of Clifford
does not render the search unconstitutional2. Blanton could, as the defense points out,
have completed the search himself by leaving Clifford in the custody of another officer,
but the Supreme Court has found that reasonable police regulations administered in good
faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though the courts might as a matter of
hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.
Bertine, 479 US 367, 374. The fact that Blanton did not personally complete the
inventory, therefore, does not constitute a deviation from standard procedures that
indicates a pretextual search.
The defense also argues that Blanton did not decide to impound the vehicle until
after exhausting other avenues of arresting Clifford. However, Blanton testified that he
impounds ninety-nine percent of the vehicles where the owner has allowed the
registration to lapse for a period as long as nine months. HT. pg. 32,1. 6-11. The
moment Blanton realized that the car's registration had expired nine months earlier,
before Blanton even initiated the traffic stop, there was only a one percent chance that
Clifford's vehicle would not be impounded. Furthermore, the appellate court has held
that, when an officer is confronted with registration violations, the determinative
evidence is what the officer actually did, without regard to his motives in a particular
case. Strickling, 844 at 987. In Strickling, the court was satisfied that the officer had not
impounded the vehicle as a pretext for another motive where the officer had testified that
he impounded a majority of the vehicles he stopped for expired registration. Id. at 987.
2

See discussion infra pgs. 12-13.
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The defense also argues that Blanton's search is suspect because he began the
search on the passenger side of the car. The defense reasons that because the passenger
had been drinking, Blanton believed he would be more likely to find contraband in that
portion of the vehicle. It is more likely, however, that Blanton began his search on the
passenger side simply because he was already there. Blanton could not begin his search
until the passenger had exited the vehicle. Blanton asked the passenger to step out, then
patted the passenger down for weapons. HT pg. 9,1. 12-15. It was natural for Blanton to
begin his search on the passenger side because he was already at the left side of the
vehicle.
The defense also attempts to compare Blanton's conduct to the behavior of the
officer who conducted an invalid inventory search in Hygh. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,
268 (Utah 1985). The defense, however, has misread Hygh. The officer in Hygh had
neglected to involve the defendant in deciding how to secure the valuables in the
impounded car, and the defense claims that Blanton's conduct is similar because he did
not ask Clifford if there was anything of value in Clifford's car. HT. p. 24,1. 20-22. The
court found the Hygh officer's failure to question the defendant about any valuables in
the car indicative of pretext because the officer's department procedures specifically
instructed the officer to question the defendant . Hygh, 711 at 269. The court, therefore,
found the officer's conduct to be suspect not because he had failed to question, but
because the failure to question deviated from department procedure. The failure to
question was another example of noncompliance with department policies. Id.

3

D. PEOCEDURE AFFECTING ALL IMPOUNDS.
1. When an impound occurs with the owner present, the officer should ask the owner if anything of
value is in the vehicle . . . . Hygh, 711 at 269.
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Furthermore, in State v. Johnson the defendant argued that the officer had
conducted a pretextual inventory search because the officer did not give the defendant an
opportunity to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his valuables. State v.
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987). While the court noted that the officer could
have made other arrangements, the court held that failing to provide that opportunity does
not eliminate the justification for taking inventory. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454. The
court looked to the language in Bertine stating that "the real question is not what could
have been achieved but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps." Johnson
IAS at 454. The court found that the interest the officers had in protecting themselves
against claims of stolen property justified the inventory, therefore providing the
defendant with another means of securing his property was not required under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 454.
The court also looked to the surrounding circumstances to determine the existence
of justification for the impoundment. Johnson IAS at 454. The court found that where
the defendant did not have a driver's license and his companions were under the
influence of controlled substances, the officers were justified in impounding the vehicle
rather than giving the defendant the opportunity to dispose of his property himself. Id. at
454. Blanton was confronted with a similar situation. Clifford was an uninsured driver
whose registration had expired, and his companion had been drinking alcohol. Neither of
them could properly move the vehicle from the parking lot. Blanton, therefore, was
justified in impounding the vehicle rather than providing an opportunity for Clifford to
remove the truck.
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The inventory search Blanton conducted of Clifford's vehicle was not a pretext
for a "fishing expedition for evidence." Blanton complied with department procedures
and did not act in any way that indicates that his decision to impound the vehicle was a
means of "rummaging through" its contents in a hunt for incriminating evidence.

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to
Suppress because the search was a constitutional inventory search. The State established
the Sheriffs Department's inventory procedures and that Deputy Blanton adhered to the
procedures. Deputy Blanton's valid inventory search was not a pretext concealing an
investigatory motive. Therefore, the denial of the motion should be AFFIRMED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED \K\sQV_ day of November, 1998

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
Salt Lake County District Attorney

TRINA A. HIGGINS
Deputy District Attorney
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